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Summary
When Mr. Raphael Lemkin invented the term genocide in 1944 he was trying to 
fill the void in the existing list of international crimes because, in his view, none 
of them was appropriate to address the terrible mass atrocities of World War II. 
The mass extermination of Jews, Gypsies, Slavs and other groups should have 
been different from “ordinary” crimes against humanity. His fight led to the 
adoption of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide in 1948. Although the Convention was primarily designed to punish 
individual perpetrators, States parties can also be held responsible for the same 
crime. The reference in Article IX of the Convention to the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice clearly shows in that direction. However, the first 
case appearing before that court was the case of Bosnia v. Serbia in 1993 and 
the Court made its ruling on the merits in 2007. The following ruling concerned 
the case of Croatia v. Serbia in 2015. Neither of the final rulings established the 
responsibility of the respondent state for genocide, although the crime had been 
established in the case of Bosnia. The article will look into the requirements for 
the genocide to be established and what was the missing link between the crime 
and the defendant state.
Keywords: Genocide Convention; International Court of Justice; Bosnian 
genocide case; Croatia; Serbia.
1. INTRODUCTION
The crime of genocide is often called the crime of crimes, as the worst crime 
that can be committed by humans against other humans. Its genesis in legal terms is 
connected with the atrocities committed in WW2 against the Jews and other groups 




in	 1915-1917	 is	 still	 on-going.	 Lately,	 the	 dispute	 was	 internationalized	 as	 other	 states	
are	 taking	 sides.	See	 the	 list	 of	 States	 agreeing	with	Armenia	 (21)	 at	 ˂	 http://genocide.am/
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judiciary.	 Between	 1990	 and	 1998	 horrible	 massive	 crimes	 and	 atrocities	 were	




Their	 judgements	 reflect	 their	 different	 jurisdictions	 and	 their	 statutes,	 but	 their	
case-law	clarified	the	basic	requirements	and	elements	for	a	crime	to	be	considered	
“genocide” and to distinguish it from similar concepts of the crimes against humanity 
and ethnic cleansing. 
It	will	be	 the	 task	of	 this	paper	 to	 look	 into	 the	present	understanding	of	 the	
crime of genocide as interpreted by these courts with a particular emphasis on the 
two	cases	decided	by	the	ICJ	dealing	with	the	wars	in	former	Yugoslavia.	The	first	
case appearing before that court was the case of Bosnia v. Yugoslavia in 1993. The 
Court	made	its	ruling	on	the	merits	in	2007.	The	following	ruling	concerned	the	case	
of	Croatia	v.	Serbia	in	2015.	Neither	of	the	final	rulings	established	the	responsibility	
of the respondent State for genocide, although the crime itself had been established in 
the	case	of	Bosnia.	The	article	will	look	into	the	requirements	for	the	genocide	to	be	
established	and	what	was	the	missing	link	between	the	crime	and	the	respondent	State.
2. GENOCIDE AND THE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The	term	genocide	was	defined	as	a	separate	crime	by	a	Polish-Jewish-American	
lawyer	Raphael	Lemkin.3 In 1944 he wrote about “a crime without a name”4 consisting 
of	“the	destruction	of	whole	populations	-	of	national,	racial	and	religious	groups	-	













against Humanity, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2016.  
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exterminate	national,	religious	or	racial	groups”	reflecting	the	Holocaust committed 
against Jews and other groups in WW2.6 
By that time it was already too late to have this crime included in the Nuremberg 
trial to the Nazi leading criminals.7	The	trial	was	based	on	the	London	Charter	and	the	
Statute of the International Military Tribunal from 1945. It provided three categories 
of crimes: crimes against the peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
which included murder, enslavement or deportation of civilians or persecution on 
political,	religious	or	racial	grounds.	As	described	in	the	London	Charter	and	based	
in international customary law, the crimes against humanity come rather close to the 










it subject to international jurisdiction.10
Lemkin	 advocated	 and	 even	 strongly	 lobbied	 for	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 new	
international convention that will have covered genocide as a separate crime, different 
from the hitherto existing crimes against humanity with all their limitations. The 
United	Nations	General	Assembly	was	 open	 to	 suggestion	 based	 on	 the	 1946	GA	







humanity	 of	 persecution.	 Prosecutor	 v.	 Sikirica	 et	 al.,	 (Case	 No.	 IT-95-8-I),	 Judgment	 on	
Defence	Motions	to	Acquit,	3	September	2001,	para.	58,	a.	See: Daillier,	P.,	Pellet,	A.,	Quoc	
Dinh,	N.,	Droit	International	Public,	7th	ed.,	Paris,	L.G.D.J.,	2002,	p.	715.
9 Schabas claims that since then the law concerning crimes against humanity has evolved 
substantially: “That crimes against humanity may be committed in time of peace as well as 
war has been recognized in the case law of the ad hoc	international	tribunals,	and	codified	in	
the	Rome	Statute.”	Schabas,	W.,	Genocide	in	International	Law:	The	Crime	of	Crimes,	2nd ed., 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 14.
10 The	 existing	 law	 at	 the	 time	was	 interpreted	 as	 preventing	 interfering	 in	 ‘domestic	 affairs’	
whatever	their	nature.	(The	concept	still	exists	and	is	known	as	domain réservé although much 
narrower).	Allied	Powers	were	looking	for	the	way	to	include	the	atrocities	committed	against	
Germans	under	the	charges	in	Nuremberg	so	they	connected	them	to	the	aggressive	war:	“They	
were a part of the preparation for war or for the conduct of the war in so far as they occurred 
inside	of	Germany	and	that	makes	them	our	concern.”	Minutes	of	Conference	Session	of	23	
July	1945,	available	at	˂	http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack44.asp˃	(visited	17.09.2019).
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the protection of human rights.12	They	both	marked	the	beginning	of	an	era	in	which	
the	protection	and	promotion	of	human	rights	will	be	an	object	of	international	co-
operation and universal implementation.
The	Convention	 entered	 into	 force	 in	 1951	 after	 the	first	 twenty	 instruments	
of	 ratification	were	deposited	and	 in	2019	 it	has	152	States	Parties	out	of	193	UN	
Member States.13	Its	Article	IX	provides	for	the	jurisdiction	of	the	International	Court	
of	Justice	(ICJ)	for	disputes	between	the	States	Parties	“relating	to	the	interpretation,	
application	or	 fulfilment	of	 the	present	Convention,	 including	 those	 relating	 to	 the	
responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article 
III	…	at	the	request	of	any	of	the	parties	to	the	dispute.”	This	provision	will	be	the	
legal foundation for the disputes that were brought before the ICJ in 1990ies.14	For	the	
first	time	in	its	history	they	gave	the	ICJ	the	opportunity	to	give	its	interpretation	of	
the Convention and to connect it to the rules on State responsibility. 
However,	 before	 the	 inter-State	genocide	 cases,	 the	 ICJ	had	had	 a	 chance	 to	
look	into	the	Convention	but	from	another	point	of	view.	Namely,	 in	1951	the	UN	
GA	 asked	 the	Court	 to	 give	 an	 advisory	 opinion	 regarding	 the	 reservations	 to	 the	
Genocide	Convention.15	 In	 it	opinion	 the	 ICJ	associated	GA	Resolution	96(I)	with	
the Convention and concluded “that the principles underlying the Convention are 
principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without 
any conventional obligation” thus recognizing the universal nature of its rules.16 






13 UN	 Treaty	 Collection,	 available	 at:	 ˂https://treaties.un.org/˃.	 According	 to	 Art.	 14	 the	
Convention had a limited duration of 10 years that was supposed to be extended thereafter for 
successive	periods	of	five	years.	So	far,	neither	party	has	renounced	the	Convention.
14 Degan	 claims	 that	 this	 is	 the	 only	 multilateral	 treaty	 which	 entitles	 its	 States-parties	 to	
unilaterally	bring	 claims	 against	 any	other	State-party	before	 the	 ICJ.	Degan,	V.	Đ.,	Zločin	
genocida	pred	Međunarodnim	sudom	u	Haagu,	Zbornik	radova	Pravnog	fakulteta	u	Splitu,	53,	
2/2016, p. 334.  
15 The	request	was	provoked	by	the	fact	 that	some	States,	 including	the	Soviet	Union,	made	a	
reservation	to	Art.	IX.	The	question	was	raised	by	some	other	States	(signatory	and	contracting	
States)	whether	they	were	entitled	to	do	so	and	even	whether	they	could	be	considered	parties	
to the Convention. 
16 Reservations	to	the	Convention	on	the	Prevention	and	Punishment	of	the	Crime	of	Genocide	
(Advisory	Opinion),	[1951]	I.C.J.	Reports	16,	p.	23.
17 The concept of jus cogens	was	codified	in	the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties,	Art.	
50.	The	UN	International	Law	Commission	illustrated	the	concept	with,	among	others,	the	use	
of force, piracy and genocide. Daillier and Pellet, op.cit., p. 205.
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norm has erga omnes scope.18 This has been broadly accepted by the writers and the 
practitioners not just of international law, but also at the national level.19 The ICJ has 
confirmed	 that	 the	prohibition	of	genocide	 is	 a	 rule	of	 the	 customary	 international	
law.20	Moreover,	the	ICJ	confirmed	that	the	prohibition	of	genocide	is	„assuredly”	a	
peremptory	norm	(jus cogens)	of	international	law.21
In further development of international criminal law the Security Council of 




the elements of the crime of genocide in relation to individual criminal responsibility. 
The	ICJ	recognized	the	value	of	their	work	in	establishing	facts	although	the	ICJ	has	
not always accepted their legal views.23 In both the Bosnian and the Croatian case the 
ICJ	accepted	“as	highly	persuasive	relevant	findings	of	fact”	by	the	ICTY	and	claimed	
that	it	would	attach	“the	utmost	importance	to	the	factual	and	legal	findings	made	by	
the ICTY in ruling on the criminal liability of the accused before it” including the 
Tribunal’s	findings	about	the	existence	of	the	required	intent.24 
The	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	established	in	2002	by	the	Rome	Statute	
as a permanent criminal court also provides for the crime of genocide as one of the 




they relate, there is a difference in nature. The former concept concerns the scope of application 
of the relevant rule, that is the extent to which states as a generality may be subject to the rule 
in	question	and	may	be	seen	as	having	a	legal	interest	in	the	matter.	It	has,	therefore,	primarily	
a	procedural	 focus.	Rules	of	 jus cogens, on the other hand, are substantive rules recognised 
to	be	of	a	higher	status	as	such.”	Shaw,	M.,	International	Law,	6th ed., Cambridge, Cambridge 
University	Press	2008,	p.	124.
19 See	 	 Jorgic	 v.	 Germany,	 ECtHR	 2007.	The	 applicant	was	 sentenced	 by	German	 courts	 for	
genocide	committed	in	Bosnia	(Doboj).
20 For	example	in	Application	of	the	Convention	on	the	Prevention	and	Punishment	of	the	Crime	








23 See	 critical	 observations	 by	 Sa´Couto,	 S.,	 Reflections	 on	 the	 Judgment	 of	 the	 International	
Court	 of	 Justice	 in	Bosnia’s	Genocide	Case	 against	Serbia	 and	Montenegro,	Human	Rights	
Brief,	15,	2/2007,	pp.	2–6.	
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punishable acts.25 However, more than 15 years on this court has not developed any 
relevant practice concerning genocide.26
3. GENOCIDE CASES BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE
As	said	before,	the	ICJ	has	been	in	position	to	interpret	the	1948	Convention	
in	connection	with	 the	wars	 in	 the	 former	Yugoslavia.	The	break-up	of	Yugoslavia	
was	bloody	and	cruel.	The	regime	of	Slobodan	Milošević	in	Belgrade	incited	wars	
in	Croatia,	Bosnia	and	Hercegovina	and	finally	 in	Kosovo	that	resulted	in	barbaric	
atrocities and violence. Two States, Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1993 and Croatia 
in	1999,	decided	 to	engage	Art.	 IX	of	 the	Convention.	They	brought	cases	against	
Serbia to the ICJ in The Hague claiming that the atrocities committed by the Yugoslav 
People’s	Army	 and	 the	 Serbian	 forces	 amounted	 to	 genocide	 and	 that	 Serbia	was	
internationally responsible.27	Serbia	filed	counter-claims	in	both	cases	but	retracted	
the one against Bosnia and Hercegovina. Before the decision was made on the merits, 







It would not be possible in this article to describe in details the factual and 




into force 1 July 2002.
26 So	far,	there	has	been	only	one	defendant	charged	with	the	crime	of	genocide,	Omar	Al-Bashir.	
However,	 he	 is	 still	 at	 large	 so	 the	 case	 is	 in	 pre-trial	 phase.	 International	Criminal	Court,	
˂https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir˃	(visited	17.09.2019).	




28 Application	of	 the	Convention	on	the	Prevention	and	Punishment	of	 the	Crime	of	Genocide	
(Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	v.	Yugoslavia),	Preliminary	Objections,	Judgment	of	11	July	1996,	
I.C.J.	 Reports	 1996,	 p.	 595	 (henceforth:	 Bosnia	 1996).	Application	 of	 the	 Convention	 on	
the	 Prevention	 and	 Punishment	 of	 the	 Crime	 of	 Genocide	 (Croatia	 v.	 Serbia),	 Preliminary	
Objections,	Judgment,	I.C.J.	Reports	2008,	p.	412	(henceforth:	Croatia	2008).	
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much of the insecurity and variety of approaches to this issue and consolidated many 
aspects of this crime. It is only normal that the Court did it in the context of the 
contemporary developing international criminal and humanitarian law. Nevertheless, 
critics	may	also	ask	whether	the	ICJ	failed	fully	to	use	the	opportunity	to	help	prevent	
and	punish	the	crime	of	genocide	as	well	as	to	make	States	responsible	for	those	under	
their wing who commit the crime. 
3.1. Definition of Genocide
The ICJ decided that the Convention is the sole basis of its jurisdiction and the 
applicable law. It would, however, also apply other applicable rules of international 
law, such as the rules on interpretation of treaties or those relating to the responsibility 
of States.30	In	other	words,	it	would	not	look	beyond	the	Convention	for	establishing	
whether	 the	crime	of	genocide	was	committed.	Consequently,	 if	 the	crime	was	not	
committed,	the	Court	would	not	look	into	any	other	question.	
Art.	II	of	the	Convention	defines	the	crime	of	genocide	as:	“any	of	the	following	
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group, as such:
(a)	Killing	members	of	the	group;
(b)	Causing	serious	bodily	or	mental	harm	to	members	of	the	group;




Accordingly,	there	are	two	elements	of	the	crime:	a)	Actus reus as the physical 
element	and	b)	Mens rea as the mental element of the act. The mens rea is necessary in 
criminal law as the perpetrator, in order to be held responsible, has to have the intent 
to	commit	the	acts	-	willingly	or	inadvertently	or	with	negligence.	However,	the	mens 





In order to determine the mental element, the Court had to establish the meaning 
of “destruction of a group”. The group in this context must be distinguishable from 
other groups but it does not mean the group in its totality since the Convention provides 
30 Croatia	2015,	para.	124-125.	
31 Shaw concludes: “[P]erhaps the distinctive feature of the crime is the importance of establishing 
the	specific	intent	to	destroy	the	group	in	question	in	whole	or	in	part,	for	genocide	is	more	than	
the	act	of	killing.	This	was	emphasised	by	the	ICTY	in	the	Jelisić	case,	which	noted	that	‘it	is	
in fact the mens rea [i.e. the intention as distinct from the actual act] which gives genocide its 
speciality and distinguishes it from an ordinary crime and other crimes against international 
humanitarian	law’.”	Shaw, M., op. cit., p. 431.
32 Croatia 2015, para. 130.
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for the destruction of the group “in whole or in part”. In Bosnia the Court established 
that “in part” has to relate to a substantial part of the group.33	Furthermore,	the	size	
of	the	group	is	determined	with	respect	to	the	geographical	area	of	the	perpetrator’s	
activity and control such as a region of a country or even a municipality.34 The Court 
relied	on	the	Krstić	judgment	of	the	ICTY	that	even	the	prominence	of	the	destroyed	
group	may	be	relevant	“if	a	specific	part	of	 the	group	is	emblematic	of	 the	overall	




against Muslims, Croats and members of other groups without much distinction.36	On	
the other hand, Muslim men in the Srebrenica region could be considered as a group 





The core of the crime of genocide is the destruction of the group. The Court 
insists that the destruction has to be physical or biological and that all acts enumerated 
in	Art.	II	have	to	have	that	object	or	 intent.39	According	to	the	Court	“the	intent	 to	
destroy	a	national,	ethnic,	racial	or	religious	group	as	such	is	specific	to	genocide	and	
distinguishes it from other related criminal acts such as crimes against humanity and 
persecution”.40	This	intent	reflects	dolus specialis.	The	killings	have	to	be	deliberate;	
the torture, including rape, has to be serious and contributing to the destruction of the 
group as have to be the conditions of life that the group was put in. The overall number 
of	victims	has	to,	therefore,	reflect	that	intent	and	it	has	to	be	substantial.41 
33 Bosnia	2007,	p.	126,	para.	198.
34 ibid, para. 199.
35 The	ICTY	concluded	that	“the	intent	to	destroy	a	group,	even	if	only	in	part,	means	seeking	to	




38 This was not disputed by Serbia. Croatia 2015, paras. 205, 406.  
39 The	 Court	 did	 not	 accept	 “cultural	 genocide”	 although	 it	 took	 into	 consideration	 acts	 of	
destruction of cultural monuments and institutions as part of efforts to destroy the group: 
“[The	Court]	endorses	the	observation	made	in	the	Krstić	case	that	‘where	there	is	physical	or	
biological	destruction	there	are	often	simultaneous	attacks	on	the	cultural	and	religious	property	
and	 symbols	 of	 the	 targeted	 group	 as	 well,	 attacks	 which	 may	 legitimately	 be	 considered	
as	 evidence	of	 an	 intent	 to	 physically	destroy	 the	group.’”	Bosnia	 2007,	 para.	 344.	Similar	
reasoning	found	in	Croatia	2015,	para.	387.
40 Bosnia	2007,	pp.	121-122,	paras.	187-188.	
41 In the Croatian case the Court opined that the number of 12.500 deaths claimed by Croatia 
“is	small	in	relation	to	the	size	of	the	targeted	part	of	the	group”	(1.7	to	1.8	millions),	Croatia	
2015,	para.	437.	With	respect	to	the	counter-claim	the	Court	emphasized	that	“not	all	of	the	acts	
alleged by Serbia as constituting the physical element of genocide have been factually proved. 
Those	which	have	been	proved,	 in	particular	 the	killing	of	civilians	and	 the	 ill-treatment	of	
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As	 for	 the	 physical	 element	 of	 the	 crime,	 it	 consists	 of	 the	 acts	 enumerated	
in	Art.	II	of	the	Convention.	In	the	cases	brought	by	Bosnia	and	Croatia	the	parties	
showed	 evidence	 of	mass	 killings,	 tortures,	 rapes,	mutilations,	 even	 death	 camps.	
Much	of	the	evidence	was	taken	from	the	case	law	of	the	ICTY	that	the	ICJ,	as	was	
shown above, accepted “as highly persuasive”.42 Based on this and other evidence, 
the	Court	did	not	have	many	difficulties	 in	concluding	 that	actus reus had in most 
cases	been	established,	especially	with	respect	to	paragraphs	a)	and	b)	of	Art.	II.43 In 
addition, the Court established that concentration or death camps in Bosnia were the 
places	where	terrible	conditions	were	inflicted	upon	detainees.44
However, the established actus reus does not amount to genocide unless 
committed with the special intent or dolus specialis	which	takes	it	over	the	threshold	
from crime against humanity to the “crime of crimes”. In the Bosnian genocide case 
the	Court	made	very	explicit	interpretation	of	that	requirement:
“187.	It	is	not	enough	that	the	members	of	the	group	are	targeted	because	they	
belong to that group, that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. 
Something	more	 is	 required.	The	acts	 listed	 in	Article	 II	must	be	done	with	 intent	
to	destroy	the	group	as	such	in	whole	or	in	part.	The	words	‘as	such’	emphasize	that	
intent to destroy the protected group.”
The crime of “ethnic cleansing” is often overlapping with genocide due to the 
similarities between their executions.45 It is fair to say that the actus reus is the same 
since in both cases it includes extreme violence against the protected population.46 The 
Court, nevertheless, rejected to consider ethnic cleansing as genocide despite the fact 
defenceless individuals, were not committed on a scale such that they could only point to the 
existence of a genocidal intent”. Ibid, para. 512.
42 The	Serbian	counter-claim	against	Croatia	relied	mostly	on	the	Trial	Chamber	verdict	against	
Croatian	generals	Gotovina	and	Markač.	However,	when	 the	Appeals	Chamber	quashed	 the	










the necessary dolus specialis.
45 According	to	the	Commission	of	Experts	established	by	the	UN	SC	in	1992	(Res.	780)	“ethnic	
cleansing”	 is	 a	 “relatively	new”	expression	 (Interim	Report	of	10	February	1993,	UN	Doc.	






status.”	 Blum,	 R.	 et	 al.,	 ‘Ethnic	 Cleansing’	 Bleaches	 the	Atrocities	 of	Genocide,	 European	
Journal	of	Public	Health,	18,	2/2007,	p.	204.
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that the former may amount to the latter. Whether genocide happened will depend “on 
the	presence	or	absence	of	acts	listed	in	Article	II	of	the	Genocide	Convention,	and	of	
the intent to destroy the group as such. In fact, in the context of the Convention, the 
term	“ethnic	cleansing”	has	no	legal	significance	of	its	own.”47 It may, however, “be 
significant	as	indicative	of	the	presence	of	a	specific	intent	(dolus specialis)	inspiring	
those acts”.48
How does one establish whether the crimes were perpetrated with the special 
intent	 to	 destroy	 a	 national,	 ethnic	 or	 religious	 group?	The	 difficulty	 of	 obtaining	








the	specific	 intent	 to	commit	genocide.	Although	they	spoke	of	 the	 intent	 to	create	
an ethnically clean Serbian State, the Court was not convinced that this goal could 
only be achieved through genocide. In the Croatian case the Court did not accept 
that	 a	 memorandum	 issued	 by	 the	 Serbian	Academy	 of	 Science	 is	 contemplating	
the	 future	 genocide	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 creating	 the	Greater	 Serbia.	The	 document	
has,	 in	 the	Court’s	 view,	 no	 official	 standing	 and	 “certainly	 does	 not	 contemplate	
the destruction of the Croats”.51	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Serbian	 counter-claim	 against	
Croatia,	 the	Court	 rejected	claims	by	Serbia	 that	 the	so-called	Brioni	Transcript	of	
the	meeting	of	Croatia’s	 top	military	 leaders	before	 the	military	operation	“Storm”	
would represent a genocidal plan. Instead, the Court concluded that it is “far from 
demonstrating an intention on the part of the Croatian leaders physically to destroy the 
group of Croatian Serbs, or the substantial part of that group constituted by the Serbs 
living in Krajina.”52
In	absence	of	a	State	plan	the	Court	looked	for	the	special	intent	through	“the	
pattern of behaviour” or “the pattern of conduct”. In addition, it “may be inferred from 




49 UN	Doc.	A/C.6/215	Rev.	1.	The origin of the term and its connection to genocide is discussed 
in	 a	 contemporary	 article	 by	 Petrović,	D.,	 Ethnic	Cleansing	 -	An	Attempt	 at	Methodology,	
European	Journal	of	International	Law,	5,	3/1994,	p.	342.
50 Even	the	final	protocol	of	 the	Wannsee	Conference	held	 in	1942	never	explicitly	mentioned	
extermination of the Jews although it was the bases of the Holocaust. Wannsee Conference, 
˂https://www.britannica.com/event/Wannsee-Conference˃	(visited	17.09.2019).
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“The dolus specialis,	 the	 specific	 intent	 to	 destroy	 the	 group	 in	whole	 or	 in	
part, has to be convincingly shown by reference to particular circumstances, unless a 
general	plan	to	that	end	can	be	convincingly	demonstrated	to	exist;	and	for	a	pattern	
of conduct to be accepted as evidence of its existence, it would have to be such that it 
could only point to the existence of such intent”.54 
Moreover, “for a pattern of conduct, that is to say, a consistent series of acts 
carried	out	over	a	specific	period	of	 time,	 to	be	accepted	as	evidence	of	genocidal	
intent, it would have to be such that it could only point to the existence of such intent, 
that	is	to	say,	that	it	can	only	reasonably	be	understood	as	reflecting	that	intent”.55
Looking	at	the	established	actus reus in the cases before it, the Court recognized 
the	necessary	 intent	only	 in	 the	massacre	 in	Srebrenica	when	about	8.000	Muslim	
men	had	been	killed	between	13	and	19	of	July	1995.56 In reaching this conclusion 
the	Court	 relied	 heavily	 on	 the	 ICTY	 judgments	 in	 the	Krstić	 and	 the	Blagojević	
and	Jokić	cases,	accepting	their	findings	that	the	Serbian	forces	at	one	point	changed	
their	military	 target	 from	“reducing	 the	enclave	 to	 the	urban	area”	 to	“taking	over	
Srebrenica town and the enclave as a whole.” Moreover: 
“[A]ll	 these	 acts	 constituted	 a	 single	 operation	 executed	 with	 the	 intent	 to	
destroy	the	Bosnian	Muslim	population	of	Srebrenica.	The	Trial	Chamber	finds	that	
the	Bosnian	Serb	forces	not	only	knew	that	the	combination	of	the	killings	of	men	
with the forcible transfer of women, children and elderly, would inevitably result 
in the physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica, but 
clearly intended through these acts to physically destroy this group.”57 
As	 for	 other	 instances	 that	 Bosnia	 claimed	were	 genocide	 the	 Court	 agreed	
that	in	many	places	horrific	crimes	were	committed	against	the	non-Serb	population	
and the pattern of conduct was discernible. Nevertheless, none of them amounted to 
genocide but was consistent with crimes against humanities, crime of persecution, 
killing,	torture,	rape,	ethnic	cleansing.58 
In the Croatian case the Court accepted that there was a “pattern of conduct … 
in	widespread	attacks	by	the	JNA	and	Serb	forces	on	localities	with	Croat	populations	
in various regions of Croatia, according to a generally similar modus operandi.”59 
It	 consisted	 of	 a	 joint	 attack	 and	 occupation	 by	 the	 JNA	 and	 Serb	 forces	 of	 the	




55 Croatia 2015, para. 510.
56 Bosnia	2007,	para.	295-297.
57 Blagojević,	IT-02-60-T,	Judgment,	17	January	2005,	para.	674,	677.	





events reviewed above reveal a consistent pattern of conduct which could only point to the 
existence	of	such	intent.”	Bosnia	2007,	para.	376.
59 Croatia 2015, para. 416.
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localities.	They	would	then	create	a	climate	of	fear	and	coercion,	by	killing	people	
and committing other violent acts against the population and the occupation would 
end with the forced expulsion of the Croat population.60 Nevertheless, the Court 
insisted that the genocidal intent had to be the only possible reasonable conclusion 
of the pattern of conduct which the Court could not reach in this case. In its view, 
there	 could	 be	 other	 explanations	 for	 such	 conduct,	 like	 the	 ethnic	 cleansing	 that	
the	Court	 refused	 to	equate	with	genocide	or	 the	punishment	of	 the	enemy,	as	 the	
Court concluded in one of the most prominent cases claimed by Croatia, that of the 
massacre	 of	Vukovar.61	 In	 the	 case	 of	 counter-claim	of	Serbia	 against	Croatia,	 the	
Court could not establish the pattern of conduct. Despite the established actus reus 
in	some	instances,	the	Court	concluded	that	“Serbia’s	‘pattern	of	conduct’	argument	
cannot succeed. The Court cannot see in the pattern of conduct on the part of the 
Croatian	authorities	immediately	before,	during	and	after	Operation	“Storm”	a	series	
of	acts	which	could	only	reasonably	be	understood	as	reflecting	the	intention,	on	the	
part of those authorities, physically to destroy, in whole or in part, the group of Serbs 
living in Croatia.” The scale of the crimes committed did not point “to the existence 
of a genocidal intent”.62






claim because no genocide was established by the Court.63
4. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENOCIDE





under customary international law. It had to decide whether the acts were committed 
by	persons	 or	 organs	whose	 conduct	 is	 attributable,	 specifically	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	
events	at	Srebrenica,	to	the	Respondent.64
60 ibid., para. 415.
61 ibid.,	para.	430.	The	Court	relied	on	the	findings	of	the	ICTY	and	the	fact	that	no	charges	were	
made	for	genocide	in	Ovčara	mass	killings	after	the	fall	of	Vukovar.	It	also	gave	weight	to	the	






Council of Ministers in June 2005. 
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The	Court	confirmed	that	States	can	be	responsible	for	the	crime	of	genocide,	
not just for failing to prevent it but also for perpetrating it: 
“It would be paradoxical if States were thus under an obligation to prevent, 
so far as within their power, commission of genocide by persons over whom they 
have	a	certain	 influence,	but	were	not	forbidden	to	commit	such	acts	 through	their	
own	organs,	or	persons	over	whom	they	have	such	firm	control	that	their	conduct	is	
attributable to the State concerned under international law. In short, the obligation to 
prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of the commission of genocide.”65 
States can commit international crimes through the actions of their organs or 
persons or groups whose acts are attributable to them but, said the ICJ, the evidence 
had to be “at a high level of certainty appropriate to the seriousness of the allegation.”66
The	 rules	 on	 attribution	 are	 codified	 by	 the	 ILC	 Draft	 Articles	 on	 State	
Responsibility	 (henceforth:	Draft	Articles)	as	adopted	by	 the	UN	GA	resolution	 in	
2001.67	Accordingly,	States	are	first	and	foremost	responsible	for	the	acts	or	omissions	





operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the years prior to the events at Srebrenica 
but refused to accept as proved “that there was any such participation in relation to the 






















69 Draft	Articles,	Art.	 4.2:	 „An	 organ	 includes	 any	 person	 or	 entity	 which	 has	 that	 status	 in	
accordance with the internal law of the State.“
70 Bosnia	2007,	para.	388.	
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the	“Scorpions”	could	have	been	a	State	organ	of	the	FRY	in	1991	but	lacked	evidence	
that	they	were	still	holding	the	same	position	in	mid-1995	in	Srebrenica.71 In a further 
argument	the	Court	advanced	its	quite	formalistic	approach:
“Judging	on	 the	basis	of	 these	materials,	 the	Court	 is	 unable	 to	find	 that	 the	
“Scorpions”	were,	in	mid-1995,	de jure	organs	of	the	Respondent.	Furthermore,	the	
Court notes that in any event the act of an organ placed by a State at the disposal of 
another public authority shall not be considered an act of that State if the organ was 
acting on behalf of the public authority at whose disposal it had been placed.”72 
It	seems	as	if	the	Court	condones	a	kind	of	“outsourcing”	of	genocide	–	if	States	
pass	the	actual	commission	of	the	crime	to	“another	public	authority”	including	para-
State entities, they bare no responsibility. 
The	question	of	responsibility	for	de facto organs of a State is not an easy one. 
In brief, the evidence has to show that the relationship of the perpetrators to the State 
“was so much one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it 
would	be	right	to	equate”	the	perpetrators	with	a	State	organ	or	“as	acting	on	behalf	
of	that	Government”.	Looking	for	such	a	relationship	of	dependence	in	the	Srebrenica	
genocide the Court reached a negative conclusion. In its view, the “political, military 
and logistical relations between the federal authorities in Belgrade and the authorities 
in	 Pale,	 between	 the	Yugoslav	 army	 and	 the	 VRS,	 had	 been	 strong	 and	 close	 in	







of the State “if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, 
or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the conduct”. The Court 
confirmed	that	this	is	the	rule	of	international	customary	law.74 
The	 question	 of	 the	 necessary	 “control”	 has	 been	 a	 source	 of	 controversy	
between the ICJ and the ICTY. The ICJ has established the necessary level of control 
in	the	Nicaragua	case	in	1986	when	it	opted	for	the	strict	or	effective	control	test.75	On	
the other hand, the ICTY opted for the “overall control” test.76	On	this	point	the	ICJ	
made clear its stance that the two courts have distinct jurisdictions and that the ICTY 
was not called to give views “on issues of general international law which do not lie 
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within	 the	 specific	purview	of	 its	 jurisdiction”.77 In view of the ICJ, the “effective 
control”	must	be	exercised	or	 the	State’s	 instructions	must	be	given	“in	 respect	of	
each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect 
of	 the	overall	actions	 taken	by	the	persons	or	groups	of	persons	having	committed	
the violations”.78 In the case of Srebrenica, the Court was not ready to accept that 
it was established that the massacres were committed on the instructions or under 
the	direction	of	organs	of	Serbia.	Neither	did	 the	Court	accept	 that	FRY	exercised	
effective control over the operations in Srebrenica in July 1995. It was evident that 
the	FRY	assisted	the	VRS	military,	politically	and	logistically	throughout	the	entire	
period before, during and after the genocide was committed. Nevertheless, Bosnia did 
not prove that Belgrade did that “in full awareness that the aid supplied would be used 
to	commit	genocide”	so	the	FRY	was	neither	responsible	for	complicity	in	genocide.79 
The	ICJ	did,	however,	find	Serbia	responsible	for	the	breach	of	the	Convention	with	







adjudicate charges by one State that another has perpetrated genocide.81	Furthermore,	
the	Court	 clarified	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 crime	 of	 genocide.	 In	 its	 interpretation	 the	
Court	kept	a	conservative	approach,	keeping	the	term	genocide	as	close	to	the	context	
of Holocaust as possible. It demands that dolus specialis is clearly established and that 
it	refers	to	the	intent	to	destroy	–	biologically	and	physically	–	a	defined	and	separate	
group.	Despite	many	similarities	 the	Court	 refused	 to	equate	ethnic	cleansing	with	
genocide	because	of	the	lack	of	the	dolus specialis. It is thus clear that the ICJ holds 
that ethnic cleansing is to be treated as a separate crime. In other words, the term 
genocide	 is	meant	 to	 convey	 ‘‘mass	 killing’’	whereas	 ‘‘ethnic	 cleansing’’	 signifies	
77 Bosnia	2007,	para.	401.	Abass	criticises	this	approach:	“It	 is	 thus	clear	that	the	ILC	and	the	
ICTY's	positions	reflect,	to	a	greater	extent	than	the	ICJ,	the	state	of	customary	international	






own agents were carried out, wholly or in part, on the instructions or directions of the State, or 
under	its	effective	control.”	Bosnia	2007,	para.	400-401.
79 ibid, para. 423.
80 ibid,	 para.	 471.	 The	 judges	 were	 split	 on	 all	 points	 of	 the	 judgment.	 Vice-President	 Al-
Khasawneh	appended	a	dissenting	opinion	and	Judges	Ranjeva,	Shi	and	Koroma	appended	a	
joint dissenting opinion.
81 Schabas, W., op. cit., 2009, p. 491.
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the forced removal from a particular territory. Strictly using these elements the ICJ 
established that the crime of genocide had been committed only in Srebrenica refusing 
to	accept	the	multitude	of	violent	and	horrific	crimes	elsewhere	in	Bosnia	as	being	part	
of the same genocidal scheme.82 
With	 respect	 to	 the	 Serbia’s	 responsibility	 for	 the	 Srebrenica	 genocide	
perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs forces the Court rejected the claims that the 
VRS	or	 the	Scorpions	 acted	 as	de jure or de facto	 organs	of	Serbia.	Furthermore,	
it	 also	 refused	 to	acknowledge	 that	Serbia	would	be	 responsible	based	on	 the	 rule	





open than the clandestine relationship between the US government and the contras 
in	Nicaragua.	As	the	Vice-President	of	the	Court,	Judge	Al-Khasawneh	noted	in	his	
dissent: “When... the shared objective is the commission of international crimes, to 
require	both	control	over	the	non-State	actors	and	the	specific	operations	in	the	context	
of which international crimes were committed is too high a threshold. The inherent 
danger in such an approach is that it gives States the opportunity to carry out criminal 
policies	through	non-state	actors	or	surrogates	without	incurring	direct	responsibility	
therefore.”83
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prema	njegovu	mišljenju,	 nije	 bio	 odgovarajući	 da	 opiše	 strašna	masovna	 zlodjela	
tijekom	Drugog	svjetskog	rata.	Masovna	pogubljenja	Židova,	Roma/	Cigana,	Slavena	
i	 drugih	 skupina	 trebala	 su	 biti	 različita	 od	 „običnih“	 zločina	 protiv	 čovječnosti.	
Njegova	 borba	 dovela	 je	 do	 prihvaćanja	 Konvencije	 UN	 o	 zabrani	 i	 kažnjavanju	
zločina	genocida	1948.	godine.	Iako	je	primarna	svrha	Konvencija	bila	kažnjavanje	
pojedinaca,	i	države	stranke	mogu	biti	odgovorne	zbog	počinjenja	zločina	genocida.	
Odredba	 članka	 IX.	 Konvencije	 koja	 predviđa	 nadležnost	 Međunarodnog	 suda	 u	
Haagu	 jasno	pokazuje	u	 tom	smjeru.	Pa	 ipak,	prva	parnica	pred	 tim	sudom	bila	 je	
ona	između	Bosne	i	Hercegovine	protiv	Srbije	1993.	godine	koju	je	Sud	meritorno	
presudio	2007.	Sljedeća	presuda	odnosila	se	na	predmet	Hrvatska	protiv	Srbije	2015.	




Ključne riječi: Konvencija o genocidu; Međunarodni sud; parnica o genocidu; 
Bosna i Hercegovina; Hrvatska; Srbija.
Zusammenfassung
VÖLKERMORD VOR DEM INTERNATIONALEN 
GERICHTSHOF
Als	Raphael	 Lemkin	 1944	 den	Begriff	Völkermord	 erfand,	 versuchte	 er,	 die	
Lücke	in	der	bestehenden	Liste	internationaler	Verbrechen	zu	füllen,	da	seiner	Ansicht	
nach	kein	dieser	Verbrechen	geeignet	war,	die	schrecklichen	Massengräueltaten	des	
Zweiten	Weltkriegs	 anzusprechen.	 Die	 Massenvernichtung	 von	 Juden,	 Zigeunern,	
Slawen	und	anderen	Gruppen	hätte	sich	von	„gewöhnlichen“	Verbrechen	gegen	die	
Menschlichkeit	 unterscheiden	 sollen.	 Sein	Kampf	 führte	 1948	 zur	Verabschiedung	
des	 Übereinkommens	 der	 Vereinten	 Nationen	 zur	 Verhütung	 und	 Bestrafung	 des	
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fakultet;	vesnacg@pravri.hr.
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Völkermordes.	 Obwohl	 das	 Übereinkommen	 in	 erster	 Linie	 dazu	 bestimmt	 war,	
einzelne	Täter	zu	bestrafen,	können	Vertragsstaaten	auch	für	dasselbe	Verbrechen	zur	










Schlüsselwörter: Genozid-Konvention; Internationaler Gerichtshof; Genozid-
Prozess; Bosnien; Kroatien; Serbien.
Riassunto
IL CRIMINE DI GENOCIDIO DINNANZI ALLA CORTE 
INTERNAZIONALE DI GIUSTIZIA
Quando	il	sig.	Raphael	Lemkin	nel	1944	forgiò	il	termine	genocidio,	in	realtà	
tentò	 di	 colmare	 la	 lacuna	 esistente	 nell'elenco	 dei	 crimini	 internazionali,	 poiché	
nemmeno uno, a suo parere, corrispondeva alla descrizione dei terribili crimini di 
massa	commessi	durante	 la	Seconda	guerra	mondiale.	Lo	sterminio	di	massa	degli	
ebrei, della popolazione rom, degli slavi, come anche di altri gruppi dovevano 
essere	differenti	rispetto	ai	„comuni“	crimini	contro	l’umanità.	La	sua	lotta	condusse	
all'accoglimento	 della	 Convenzione	 ONU	 per	 la	 prevenzione	 e	 la	 repressione	 del	













Parole chiave: Convenzione sul genocidio; Corte internazionale; processo sul 
genocidio; Bosnia ed Erzegovina; Croazia; Serbia.

